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and Griswold: How the Right to Privacy
Protects Popular Practices from
Democratic Failures
By ALAN JAMES KLUEGEL*
Introduction
IN HIS LANDMARK ARTICLE Beyond Carolene Products, Bruce Ack-
erman examined the Supreme Court's protection of "discrete and in-
sular" minorities (enshrined in the famous United States v. Carolene
Products' footnote2) and concluded that the groups who really needed
protection were, in fact, the opposite-the anonymous and diffuse in-
terests that cannot compete in the political marketplace.3 This Article
proposes that there is, in fact, a constitutional doctrine that protects at
least some of these anonymous and diffuse interests-the constitu-
tional right to privacy.
While most scholars interpret the right to privacy as a substantive
right,4 this Article disagrees. It can be understood as a procedural
right-an intervention to correct a defect of the political process. By
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Marianne 0. Battani. Thanks to Mark Tushnet, who
gave comments on an early draft, and to Susan McMahon and to my family, who provided
support throughout the process.
1. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
2. Id. at 152 n.4 (finding that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities...
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities" and allows for the intervention into the decisions of democrati-
cally elected legislatures to uphold minority rights).
3. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 742 (1985)
("Long after discrete and insular minorities have gained strong representation at the plu-
ralist bargaining table, there will remain many other groups who fail to achieve influence
remotely proportionate to their numbers: groups that are discrete and diffuse (like wo-
men), or anonymous and somewhat insular (like homosexuals), or both diffuse and anony-
mous (like the victims of poverty).").
4. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
544-629 (15th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2006). The cases that I will discuss are invariably listed
under "Substantive Due Process" or something similar in the dominant constitutional law
textbooks.
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shielding popular but culturally stigmatized behavior from opponents
who have a disproportionate influence on the legislative process, the
right to privacy works to uphold the utilitarian function of
democracy. 5
Part I of this Article introduces the right to privacy and the
limited areas in which courts have applied it, focusing on its modern
application to contraception, pornography, abortion, and
homosexuality.
Part II deals with the response to the right to privacy. Although
the legal establishment critiqued the right almost immediately, the
right has nonetheless endured. Over time, new critics have emerged
from all over the legal spectrum. This part outlines the most salient
criticisms from the schools of natural law, 6 process theory,7 and
originalism,8 as well as the implication of these criticisms-that the
right to privacy undermines the constitutional structure of democracy
5. Inasmuch as democracy assigns an equal weight to everyone's preferences and
involves the balancing of these preferences to achieve something like the greater good,
democracy is utility-maximizing. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London
1970) (1780); John Hart Ely, Professor Dworkin 's External/Personal Preference Distinction, 1983
DUKE L.J. 959, 979 ("I also agree that there exists a rough congruence between utilitarian
and democratic models of public choice."). Therefore, when the structural defects of de-
mocracy assign disproportionate weight to certain groups, the utilitarian function begins to
break down.
6. The theory of natural law posits that the law should conform to "universally recog-
nized principles of conduct which have a basis in elementary truths concerning human
beings, their natural environment, and aims." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 193 (2d
ed. 1994). This often has a religious overtone, although a religious connection is not neces-
sary. See Randy E. Barnett, A Law Professor's Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 655, 658-59 (1997) (arguing that while some proponents identify
the divine as the proper source of natural law, it is not necessary to involve religion to
arrive at a set of universal principles).
7. Process theory, in general, is a school ofjurisprudence that attempts to reconcile
nondemocratic judicial review with democratic decision-making by separating substance
and procedure in law. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMEICAN LAW 18 (1997) ("In the 1950s and 1960s, legal
scholars ultimately restrained the insights of legal realism by focusing on the need for
orderly processes to decide legal issues, rather than on substantive legal rules."). Thus,
matters of substantive value are properly decided by elected bodies, while the mechanisms
of the political process are appropriate for judicial review.
8. Originalism is the theory that legal documents should be interpreted in accor-
dance with either the original intent of the framers or the original meaning of the text at
the time it was written. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, Hzstory and Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. RiV. 1237, 1240 (1986) (defining originalism (also known as inter-
pretivism) as "the judicial practice of giving meaning to a legal text in accordance with the
original purposes or intentions of those who enacted it").
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by depriving the electorate of the power to make decisions in these
otherwise legitimate areas.
Part III examines the various factors that all of the right to privacy
cases have in common, focusing in particular on how the different
activities protected by the right share the factors of stigmatization, an-
onymity, diffusion, and popularity. This part introduces public choice
theory and identifies those factors that lead to disproportionate politi-
cal power (both over- and under- represented interests) in our system.
Finally, this part shows how the common factors of the protected activ-
ities place the activities and their supporters at a severe disadvantage
in the political marketplace and work to deny the supporters proper
representation.
Part IV argues that the Court, perhaps subconsciously, is inten-
tionally protecting these politically powerless groups by enveloping
them in the right to privacy. The right to privacy, therefore, serves to
advance the representation reinforcement goal of process theory by
ensuring democratic outcomes in areas where groups lack representa-
tion proportional to their numbers. I conclude by defending this con-
cept-judicial protection of popular practices from political market
failure-as upholding the utilitarian underpinnings of democracy and
by speculating what recognizing such a right would mean for other
areas of the law.
I. The History of the Modem Right to Privacy
The right to privacy has brought nothing but controversy to the
door of the Court. Various groups argue over its meaning: social con-
servatives believe it represents a subversive agenda on behalf of the
Court's liberals to undermine the popular morality;9 libertarians view
the right to privacy as a first step in restoring the substantive jurispru-
dence of Lochner v. New York10 and limited government;' 1 liberals cele-
9. The rallying cry of social conservatives-to nominate judges who "interpret and
apply the law, not make the law"-is a direct rebuke to the recognition of the admittedly
nontextual right to privacy. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, quoting Chief Justice Roberts).
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a statute limiting the weekly working hours of
bakers).
The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself
must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which
interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in
his power to contract in relation to his own labor.
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brate the newfound freedom from government action, particularly in
the areas of gender and sexuality, 12 as evidenced by the focus on this
issue during confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justices.1 3 Their
areas of disagreement are in the legitimacy and ultimate utility of that
substantive right.
In this section, I will briefly examine the cases that compose the
core of the modern right to privacy. The phrase "right to privacy" has
existed in legal doctrine since 1890 but referred to a completely dif-
ferent area of the common law and had little in common with the
right to privacy as we currently understand it.14 The modern right to
privacy was introduced in Griswold v. Connecticut,15 invalidating a crimi-
nal prohibition on birth control,1 6 and the Court has since extended
it to pornography,1 7 abortion, " ' and homosexual sodomy. 19 I will ex-
amine each of these areas in turn through both the facts of the cases
and the rationales offered by the Court.
Id, at 57-58. Lochner's central holding was essentially reversed by Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S.
426, 438-39 (1917) (upholding a law regulating overtime pay and working hours). The
Lochner decision is commonly cited as the paradigmatic example of classical libertarian
jurists imposing their own policy preferences (here, for laissez faire economics) on govern-
ments through judicial review. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
861 (1992). Despite Lochner falling into ill repute during the New Deal, it was not formally
overruled until West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937), overruled Adkins v.
Children's Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
11. See generally RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY 231-34 (2004) (recognizing the right to privacy as a bulwark against the
post-Lochner legal tradition of legislative deference).
12. See, e.g., Janet Benshoof, The Legacy of Roe v. Wade, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LE-
GAL PERSPECTIVES 35 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) ("In the history of
this country no Supreme Court decision has been so important to women's liberty, equal-
ity, and health as... Roe v. Wade .. "). But see Catherine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study
in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 45 ("I ... criticize
the doctrinal choice to pursue the abortion right under the law of privacy.").
13. See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 9, at 318 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter,
Member, S. Judiciary Comm.). Republican Senator Arlen Specter opened with a question
to Judge Samuel Alito about a woman's right to choose an abortion. Id.
14. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privay, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193,
198 (1890). This article was concerned primarily with the press "overstepping... the obvi-
ous bounds of propriety and decency" and the publication of "personal gossip." Id. at 196.
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. Id. at 485 ("[A] law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than
regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maxi-
mum destructive impact upon that relationship .... cannot stand . . ").
17. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) ("private possession of obscene
material").
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
19. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("sexual practices common to a ho-
mosexual lifestyle").
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A. Contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut
The Court's first endeavor 20 into the right to privacy occurred in
Griswold, where the Court found that a law prohibiting the private use
of contraceptives violated the constitutional right to privacy, a right
emanating from "penumbras" in the Bill of Rights. 2 1 The Court ex-
plicitly denounced Lochner-style rationales for judicial review and in-
stead suggested that the right was grounded both in tradition 22 and
hostility towards overbreadth. 23 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,2 4 the Court went
one step further, striking down an anti-contraceptive statute aimed
only at unmarried couples. 25 The Court declared that "[i] f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion." 26 Thus, the Griswold/Ei-
senstadt decisions stand for the proposition that contraception-con-
trol of one's sex life-is protected by the right to privacy.
B. Pornography in Stanley v. Georgia
In Stanley v. Georgia,27 the Court struck down the prosecution of
an individual for the private possession of pornographic materials.
28
As the Court reasoned, the "mere categorization of these films as 'ob-
scene' is insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of per-
sonal liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating ob-
scenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own
home."29 Stanley is somewhat problematic when used to bolster a
Fourth Amendment right to privacy argument because the Court
based its rationale partly on the First Amendment right of free
speech. 30 Neither the cases that preceded Stanley nor those that fol-
20. While the Court relied on its decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942),
striking down a mandatory felon-sterilization statute, id. at 541, Griswold was the first post-
Lochner enunciation of the idea that the state may not regulate within the zone of the right
to privacy. Gnswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
21. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (holding that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance").
22. Id. at 486 (stating that "a right of privacy [is] older than the Bill of Rights").
23. Id. at 485 ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms ... ?").
24. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
25. Id. at 453-54.
26. Id. at 453.
27. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
28. Id. at 568.
29. Id. at 565.
30. See id. at 560-63.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
lowed, however, extended First Amendment protection to obscene
materials-the very materials at issue in Stanley.3 I Further, in a later
case allowing the restriction of the distribution of obscene materials,
the Court explicitly distinguished Stanley on the grounds that it in-
volved "the particular privacy of the home," and the adult theater did
not involve "any of the other 'areas or zones' of constitutionally pro-
tected privacy."32 Thus, the private possession of pornography (but
not the distribution or sale) is protected by the right to privacy.
C. Abortion in Roe v. Wade
In Roe v. Wade,33 the Court famously struck down Texas's abor-
tion prohibition, finding that the "right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision. ' 34 Extending the logic of Giswold-that the in-
dividual has the right to control his or her body with regards to pro-
creation-the Court found that because the right to choose to
terminate a pregnancy is a "fundamental right," there must be a com-
pelling state interest and legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn. 35 Roe also held that the state's interest is greatest during the
third trimester of the pregnancy (post-viability3 6), but is limited to
matters of maternal health in the second trimester, and the state is
completely forbidden from intervening during the first trimester. 37
Later case law dismantled the trimester structure, created a more
amorphous viability standard, and added an "undue burden" test for
abortion regulation.38 The right to privacy thus covers abortion deci-
sions, though offering less protection than the Court afforded
contraception.
31. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (reiterating that "obscene material
is unprotected by the First Amendment"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957)
(finding that "obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press").
32. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Id. at 154.
35. Id. at 155-56.
36. Post-viability refers to the period of time when the fetus is able to survive, with or
without medical help, outside of the uterus. Id. at 160.
37. Id. at 162-65.
38. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874-76 (1992). "[An
undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus." Id. at 877. The Court's most recent abortion case, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127
S. Ct. 1610 (2007), reaffirmed and applied the Casey "undue burden" standard in finding
that a partial-birth abortion ban did not place an undue burden on the right to an abor-
tion. Id. at 1614, 1639.
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D. Homosexuality in Lawrence v. Texas
In 1986, in Bowers v. Hardwick,39 the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of criminal sodomy laws.40 In 2003, the Court overruled Bow-
ers in Lawrence v. Texas,4 t which stated that a Texas criminal statute
criminalizing same-sex "deviant" sexual conduct was unconstitu-
tional.42 The Lawrence majority relied on the decisions in Griswold, Ei-
senstadt, Roe, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey4 3 to find that constitutional protection extends to the "overt ex-
pression" of personal sexuality through intimate conduct with an-
other.44 Relying on the Griswold/Eisenstadt concept of the individual as
key to the right to privacy, the Court found that "l[p] ersons in a homo-
sexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes" and found
that homosexual sodomy was protected by a right to liberty. 45 The
Court's logic is strange in that it extends the right to privacy to sod-
omy without explicitly mentioning that sodomy is a "fundamental
right" under the right to privacy jurisprudence; however, it is the right
to privacy that serves as the basis for nearly every case it relies upon in
its decision.4 6 Nonetheless, the decision clearly flows from the contra-
ception-pornography-abortion line of cases,47 so it is likely that the
same right to privacy protects homosexual sodomy as well.
39. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
40. Id. at 196.
41. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
42. Id. at 563, 578-79.
43. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-65, 573-74, for the Court's
discussion of Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Planned Parenthood.
44. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
45. Id. at 574.
46. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Though there is discussion of 'fundamental
proposition [s],' and 'fundamental decisions,' nowhere does the Court's opinion declare
that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the Due Process Clause; nor does
it subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny)
if homosexual sodomy were a 'fundamental right."' (citations omitted)). Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. Rsv.
1893, 1916 (2004) (noting "the absence of any explicit statement in the majority opinion
about the standard of review the Court employed to assess the constitutionality of the law
at issue").
47. For example, one of the cornerstones of the earlier attack on anti-sodomy laws in
Bowers was the Stanley decision (the mix of sexual liberty and inviolability of home). Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195, 207 (1986). The Ezsenstadt and Casey decisions are quoted
heavily in Lawrence. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565, 573-74.
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II. Commentary on the Right to Privacy in the Legal
Community
The commentary on the right to privacy is both substantive (dis-
agreeing with how it has been interpreted and how it has been ap-
plied) and procedural (arguing that it is not a legitimate
constitutional right and that it stifles democratic processes). I will ex-
amine the various theories behind these critiques and conclude that
the primary objections largely stem from what is perceived as an inap-
propriate intervention by an unelected body into democratic decision-
making-the classic counter-majoritarian problem. 48
A. Natural Law Objections
There are those who simply disagree with the right to privacy on
substantive grounds, finding that it is deeply troubling on a moral49 or
ethical50 basis. These objections, while certainly representative of a
substantial body of legal and popular criticism, are not the primary
concern of this Article for two reasons. First, this line of reasoning errs
by equating constitutional legitimacy with the "right" result, thus
achieving what Professor Cass Sunstein refers to as the "activist fal-
lacy,"51 as it is highly unlikely that the Constitution holds a distinct
moral position. The substantive objection also fails on practical
grounds. In real-world application, "the only propositions with a
prayer of passing themselves off as 'natural law' are those so uselessly
vague that no one will notice,"52 and thus the application quickly be-
comes incoherent. In any case, Professor John Hart Ely correctly be-
lieved that a natural law-a law governed by a universal morality-is
"a discredited one in our society." 53
Second, the Court itself rejects the natural law/Lochner approach.
The Court in Roe begins by quoting legal realistJustice Holmes: "[The
48. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962) [hereinafter
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH].
49. See, e.g., Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41
FORDHAM L. REV. 807, 809 (1973) (calling Roe a "tragic judicial aberration that periodically
wounds American jurisprudence").
50. See, e.g., John M. Finnis, Natural Law and the Rights of the Unborn, in ABORTION AND
THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING Roe v. Wade Through the Courts 115, 115-20 (Dennis J.
Horan et al. eds., 1987).
51. J.J. Helland, Courting Disaster: Interview with Cass Sunstein, SALON.COM, Sept.12,
2005, http://dir.salon.com/story/books/int/2005/O9/12/sunstein/index.html?source=
search&aim=/books/int.
52. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 51
(1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST].
53. Id. at 50.
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Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views,
and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar
or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States." 54 The dissenters on the Court simi-
larly concern themselves entirely with a process/textualist rationale,
charging the Court with overreaching and an illegitimate review of a
democratically elected legislature. 55 The fact that none of the Court's
opinions in any of these cases relies on natural law principles in elabo-
rating their positions 56 suggests that natural law reasoning has been
discredited, and the test appears to be whether Roe is legitimate from
a process theory perspective.
B. Process Theory Problems
Critics from the process theory school view the right to privacy as
a reestablishment of the substantive constitutional jurisprudence that
process theorists (and their predecessors in the legal realist move-
ment 57) decry. 58 Process theory depends on a distinction between sub-
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
55. See, e.g., id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The decision here to break preg-
nancy into three distinct terms and to outline the permissible restrictions the State may
impose in each one, for example, partakes more of judicial legislation than it does of a
determination of the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-10 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The Court talks about a
constitutional 'right of privacy' as though there is some constitutional provision or provi-
sions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the 'privacy' of individuals.
But there is not.... I have expressed the view many times that First Amendment freedoms,
for example, have suffered from a failure of the courts to stick to the simple language of
the First Amendment in construing it, instead of invoking multitudes of words substituted
for those the Framers used. For these reasons, I get nowhere in this case by talk about a
constitutional 'right of privacy' as an emanation from one or more constitutional provi-
sions." (citations omitted)).
56. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence comes the closest, but his analysis of the
history and tradition of the prohibition of sodomy has more to do with his notion of liberty
and personal autonomy as evolving concepts and does not rest on ideas of morality. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
57. Legal realists preached an anti-formalist and empirical understanding of the law,
and they were generally opposed to natural law theories. See, e.g., Stephen Wizner, The Law
School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests ofJustice, 70 FopmHAm L. REV. 1929, 1931 (2002)
("The legal realists developed an anti-formalist theory of law.").
58. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (establishing "the
assumption that [legislative decision-making] rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators," which is emblematic of the process theory
deference towards the legislative branch); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's substantive constitutional interpretation
and arguing that the "14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Stat-
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stantive law, which should be left to the political branches, and
procedural law, which is rightly administered by the courts.59
According to this critique, by crafting a right that is unrelated to
the legal process, unlike the right to free speech, the right to vote, or
any other right that relates to the channels of political change, 60 the
Court, in recognizing the right to privacy, is deciding a matter of sub-
stantive law and is vulnerable to the counter-majoritarian problem.
Thus, in resurrecting the ghost of substantive due process, the Court
is engaging in exactly the same kind of social policy enforcement that
bedeviled the Lochner Court.61
Professor Ely attempted to explain the Court's shift back to sub-
stantive constitutional review-when everyone accuses the Court of
Lochnering, then, by God, it is going to Lochner-but he still lamented
the lack of rationalization or any connection to the Constitution or
democratic self-governance. 62 One can sense the disappointment in
Ely's writing, as if he is mourning as the twin goals of process theory-
establishing a legitimate sphere of influence for the Court and de-
fending the democratic character of the political process-are swept
ics"); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 379-81 (2003)
(explaining how Justice Hugo Black objected to the right to privacy as an extension of
Lochner). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
59. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 6, 12, 19 (1959).
Herbert Wechsler at Columbia-once a stronghold of legal realism-was a lead-
ing proponent of process theory. In his highly influential 1959 article, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, he argued that judges must be prepared to
explain their decisions by reference to principles that "transcend the case at
hand." Unlike legislators, courts are not free to function as "a naked power or-
gan"; they must instead engage in a principled judicial process. "A principled deci-
sion," wrote Wechsler, "is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in
the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any imme-
diate result that is involved." Formalists had demanded that decisions apply clear
rules announced in advance. Process theorists were willing to live without clearcut
rules and were prepared to settle instead for a fair process of decision making and
a principled explanation for the ultimate decision. For process theorists, a fair
hearing before an unbiased, principled tribunal is the best we can reasonably
expect from the legal system.
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7.
60. See generally ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 52.
61. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 937 (1973) [hereinafter Ely, The Wages of Cying Wol]] (suggesting that the Court in
Lochner "had simply manufactured a constitutional right out of whole cloth and used it to
superimpose its own view of wise social policy on those of the legislatures" and inviting a
comparison to Roe).
62. See id. at 944. "[T] his super-protected right is not inferable from ... any general
value derivable from the provisions [the framers] included . . . ." Id. at 935-36.
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away so carelessly by the resurgence of substantive due process embod-
ied in Roe.6-3
C. Originalist/Textualist Illegitimacy
A specific right to privacy cannot be found in the text of the Con-
stitution. To those who demand that rights flow only from the text of
the Constitution, this is a mortal sin. It is also highly unlikely that the
framers would have understood the Constitution to prohibit abortion,
although they would likely have supported some other kinds of pri-
vacy rights, as evidenced by the Fourth Amendment.64 According to
the originalist viewpoint, this is an insurmountable problem.
Both originalism and textualism are positivist schools of jurispru-
dence,65 and they argue that constitutional provisions have a single
specific meaning.66 The judiciary's job, according to these schools, is
to divine what that specific meaning is, rather than formulate what the
meaning should be.67
63. See id. at 935-36.
64. See, e.g., Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Centuiy? A Fourth
Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 221,
254 (1989) (stating that "[t]he fourth amendment was designed to prevent the arbitrary
and indiscriminate searches permitted by general warrants and writs of assistance" (foot-
note omitted)).
65. James A. Gardner, Whose Constitutzon Is It? Why Federalism and Constitutional Positiv-
ism Don't Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1245, 1246 (2005) (describing both originalism and
textualism as "the narrowest positivist approaches to constitutional interpretation"). In this
sense, there is overlap between the textualist/originalist position and the legal realist/pro-
cess theory position, in that both agree that the appropriate forum for substantive deci-
sions is in the legislature. The devil, of course, is in the details. Compare Wechsler, supra
note 59, at 18 (endorsing a flexible Constitution within the legal process model), with
Robert H. Bork, The Judge's Role zn Law and Culture, 1 AvE MARiA L. REv. 19, 20 (2003)
[hereinafter Bork, TheJudge's Role] (emphatically rejecting such a model). "[T ] he Supreme
Court is not supposed to invent law but to apply it, and there is no law that underlies those
decisions; they are merely expressions of the judges' will, judicial invasions of territory that
belongs to the moral choice of the American people and their elected representatives." Id.
66. Joseph Biancalana, Originalism and the Commerce Clause, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 383, 385
(2002) (arguing that originalists "want to preserve the idea, made necessary by the institu-
tional act of judging, that constitutional provisions have a single meaning, the original
meaning").
67. "[T]he judicial responsibility begins and ends with determining the present scope
and meaning of a decision that the nation, at an earlier time, articulated and enacted into
constitutional text... Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J.
227, 254 (1972). Textualism indicates a strict focus on the structure and meaning of the
words-how they interact with one another within the document-as a way of divining
original intent, while originalism focuses on the search for "original meaning," which is
how the average person at the time of drafting would have understood the text of the
document. In practice, they tend to blend together. See Biancalana, supra note 66, at
389-96.
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Because the Court should recognize only those rights found
within the plain text or the original understanding of the Constitu-
tion, originalists and textualists argue that the right to privacy is illegit-
imate.68 Professor Robert Bork argues, with regard to the right to
privacy, that "the choice of 'fundamental values' by the Court cannot
be justified.... The judge must stick close to the text and the history,
and their fair implications, and not construct new rights."69 This argu-
ment essentially presents the right to privacy as another front in the
tyranny of an unconstrained judiciary.
D. Anti-Democratic Result
Despite differing drastically with regards to their opinions about
the morality of the activity, the legitimacy ofjudicial intervention, and
even the proper source of law, all of the criticisms of the Court's inter-
pretation of the right to privacy essentially share one common conclu-
sion: the right to privacy undermines democratic self-governance.70
Liberal critics of the right to privacy assert that whether or not
the Court has the power to intervene in these areas, it is ultimately
wrong to do so, particularly when it comes to abortion, because of the
anti-democratic effects of the decision.71 By crystallizing areas of law
and making them immune to democratic change, the Court halted
progressive democratic movements and created a backlash against the
right to privacy, specifically in the area of abortion.7 2
Conservative critics assert the opposite: that the Court is frustrat-
ing a democratic majority that wishes to outlaw certain practices (pri-
marily abortion, but also homosexuality) .73 By prohibiting legislatures
from basing their decisions on "morality,"7 4 the Court is stifling demo-
cratic expression. As Professor Bork states, "The conclusion must be
that the Constitution is indeed silent on the subject of abortion, being
68. See Bork, The Judge's Role, supra note 65, at 23-24.
69. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1,
8 (1971).
70. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf supra note 61, at 932-33.
71. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 381 (1985) ("[1]n my judgment, Roe ventured too far in the
change it ordered. The sweep and detail of the opinion stimulated the mobilization of a
right-to-life movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and state legislatures.").
72. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 1-30 (1999).
73. See, e.g., Bork, The Judge's Role, supra note 65, at 24.
74. "[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a partic-
ular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (StevensJ., dissenting)).
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left, as most issues are, to the moral choice of the American people
expressed in the laws of their various states. '75
Under either view, the argument is that the Court's recognition
of the right to privacy is essentially contrary to the constitutionally
mandated system of democratic decision-making, and, as such, is
illegitimate.
III. The Role of the Right to Privacy in the Political Process
A. Common Factors to the Right to Privacy
The cases previously discussed share many common elements and
characteristics of the activities that are correlated with the protection
of the right to privacy.76 The cases share four universal characteristics
of the activities covered by the right to privacy: (1) the participants are
anonymous and (2) diffuse; (3) the activities are stigmatized; and (4)
the activities are privately popular. I will call these groups-composed
75. Bork, The Judge's Role, supra note 65, at 24.
76. This approach is informed by the statistical technique of factor analysis, a process
where a set of observed variables is reduced to a smaller set of correlated unobserved vari-
ables called "factors." SeeJAE-ON KIM & CHARLES W. MUELLER, SER. No. 07-014, FACTOR
ANALYSIS: STATISTICAL METHODS AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 8-10 (E.M. Uslaner ed., 7th prtg.
1981). Factor analysis is popular in the fields of sociology, marketing, and psychology,
which use it to reduce complex data sets to several factors that correlate with particular sets
of variables. It has been used most notably in intelligence research to support the recogni-
tion of particular cognitive areas. See HANDBOOK OF MULTIVARIATE EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL-
oG'y 288-329 (Raymond B. Cattell ed., 1966). As an example of a factor analysis approach,
suppose that a subject demonstrates aptitude in a number of activities-say, tennis, paint-
ing, and geometry-that initially appear to be unrelated. With a large enough pool of
subjects, factor analysis begins by determining if these variables are correlated (that is, if
the subjects who are good at one tend to be good at the others, and, correspondingly, the
subjects who are bad at one tend to be bad at the others). Factor analysis would then
determine if there was an unobserved factor that influences those variables (say, a cogni-
tive function called "spatial intelligence" that is a root factor for all three activities). It is my
contention that the substantive theory behind factor analysis-and not necessarily the
quantitative technique-can guide our understanding of Supreme Court doctrine. While
the decisions of the Court are not numbers in an algorithm, they can be understood as
discrete outcomes-in the factor analysis model, these are the observed variables. While
the opinions offer legal authority and reasoned elaboration to support these decisions,
legal authority or traditional legal principles are not necessarily determinative in predict-
ing outcomes. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1723-24 (1976). Furthermore, the requirement of a majority in the
decision-making process necessarily creates fractured and inconsistent logic. Frank H. Eas-
terbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 831 (1982) (applying Arrow's
Theorem of collective decision-making and concluding that "[a] t least some inconsistency,
and probably a great deal of inconsistency, is inevitable."). By searching-in an admittedly
qualitative fashion-for common factors in these cases, we can identify the unacknowl-
edged factors that influence the direction of the doctrine.
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of the participants and supporters of stigmatized-yet-popular activi-
ties-"S-groups." 77
1. Anonymous
Perhaps as a result of the stigma associated with the activities ex-
amined in the cases, the participants are largely anonymous. These
practices are largely done in two places that we have long recognized
to be private: the home78 (pornography and sodomy) and the doc-
tor's office 79 (contraception and abortion). As a result, none of the
activities involved are public knowledge.
Birth control, for example, is properly characterized as a "private"
activity because its users remain largely anonymous (thanks, in part, to
doctor-patient confidentiality). There are no reliable external signs of
use-one simply cannot tell whether another person uses birth con-
trol just by looking at him or her. Aside from the user's sexual part-
ners, knowledge about birth control use is disseminated exclusively at
the discretion of the user.80 Similarly, it is generally impossible to de-
termine whether one has had an abortion, consumed pornography,
or engaged in homosexual sodomy without the person voluntarily dis-
closing such information. Many personal characteristics that we may
consider private, like wealth, which most people generally consider
poor form to discuss publicly, are actually a matter of public record. S-
group activities, on the other hand, by virtue of their place in the
home and in the doctor's office, remain anonymous.
2. Diffuse
For each of the protected activities, those who engage in the activ-
ity and those who support the activity are diffuse; the S-group mem-
77. The term "S-groups" is a nod to the "C-groups" that Ackerman used. See Acker-
man, supra note 3, at 720.
78. "The right of the people to be secure in their.., houses.., against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (noting the traditional view of the "sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life").
79. A majority of states recognize the doctor-patient privilege, even if the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not. Catherine J. Ross, Implementing Constitutional Rights for Juveniles:
The Parent-Child Privilege in Context, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 85, 106 n.168 (2003); see also
FED. R. EVID. 501.
80. In some cases, birth control users do not even tell their sexual partners. Nineteen
percent of sexually active women report not talking to their sexual partner about birth
control options. See TINA Hors ET AL., HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A NATIONAL SURVEY
OF WOMEN ABOUT THEIR SEXUAL HEALTH 8 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/women-
shealth/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14298.
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bers are either demographically diverse, geographically diverse, or
both. Much as stigmatization leads to anonymity, anonymity allows for
geographic diffuseness. One of the reasons that the members of S-
groups are distributed throughout different communities is that they
are not necessarily easily identified and therefore, not always shunned
or otherwise forced out of a community. As a result, they do not con-
centrate in a single area.
Both pornography use and homosexual sodomy are prevalent
across the country-those who produce pornography claim that it
sells best in the most conservative parts of the country,81 and there are
gay populations in cities in conservative Texas as well as cities in lib-
eral California.8 2 Homosexual sodomy is practiced by both genders
(although in both cases, men more so than women) of all races and
socioeconomic backgrounds.8 3
Even though abortion and birth control affect only women, they
are still diffuse practices, as gender itself is a geographically diffuse
characteristic, and both practices cut across other demographic cate-
gories. For example, women who have abortions are both young and
old (about 48% above twenty-five years old), mothers and childless
(about 61% have had one or more children), and racially diverse
(about 41% White, 32% Black, and 20% Hispanic).8 4 While it is true
that abortion rates tend to be higher in certain socioeconomic
groups, it is not so greatly concentrated in any community that it
81. See Michael Scherer, Debbie Does Washington, SALON.coM, Nov. 11, 2005, http://
www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/11/11/porn-hearing (quoting Tom Hymes, a spokes-
man for the Free Speech Coalition). "The hotel rooms in Utah, for instance, download
more adult movies than any other state. I have that on a very good source." Id.
82. Dan Black et al., Why Do Gay Men Live in San Francisco?, 51 J. URB. ECON. 54, 64
tbl.1 (2002). Even though the majority of gay men and women live in metropolitan com-
munities, they do not overwhelmingly concentrate in those areas. See id.; see also GLBTQ,
Social Sciences: Demographics, http://www.glbtq.com/social-sciences/demographics.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008). Another indication of the diffuseness of the gay population is
that the highest percentage of gay adults in any one congressional district is only 16.6%.
GARYJ. GATES, SAME-SEx COUPLES AND THE GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL POPULATION: NEW ESTI-
MATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 8 (2006), available at http://www.law.ucla.
edu/williamsinstitute/publications/SameSexCouplesandGLBpopACS.pdf.
83. See Dan Black et al., Demographics of the Gay and Lesbian Population in the United
States: Evidence from Available Systematic Data Sources, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 139, 150, 152 tbl.9
(2000). "The gays and lesbians in the census sample appear to be highly educated, span
the distribution of ages, and are similar in racial makeup to the population as a whole." Id.
at 150.
84. Rachel K. Jones et al., Patterns in the Socioeconomic Characteristics of Women Obtaining
Abortions in 2000-2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 226, 228 tbl.1 (2002).
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would be identified primarily with that community.85 Similarly, con-
traception use is so widespread-62% of women between the ages of
fifteen and forty-four use some form of contraception 86-that it is also
not easily identified with a specific group (except for the extremely
diffuse category of "women of childbearing age").
3. Stigmatized
The cases construing the right to privacy deal largely with sex and
sexuality. In our cultural climate, sexual activity is potentially embar-
rassing and, in some circumstances, alienating. Many forms of sexual
expression, such as pre-marital sex and sodomy, are actively opposed
by mainstream religious organizations, including the Catholic
Church 87 and several protestant denominations, including Southern
Baptists.88 Their objection is based on the fundamental premise that it
is wrong to separate procreation from sex.89 Pornography, despite be-
ing legal, is still taboo, and revealing one's use or being caught in
possession of pornography can cause embarrassment and shame. So-
cial stigma exerts a remarkably powerful influence on human behav-
ior and, subsequently, on expressions of social power.90 The stigma
85. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., New York,
N.Y.), June 2006, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb-inducedabortion.pdf
(indicating that the abortion rate for women below the poverty line is more than four
times as high as the abortion rate for high-income women). "[W] omen who have abortions
are diverse, and unintended pregnancy leading to abortion is common in all population
subgroups." Jones et al., supra note 84, at 232.
86. Facts on Contraceptive Use, IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2008,
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb-Sontruse.pdf.
87. See Pope Paul VI, Declaration on Procured Abortion, L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO (WEEKLY
EDITION IN ENGLISH), Dec. 5, 1974, at 6. "If... one is to understand that men and women
are 'free' to seek sexual pleasure to the point of satiety, without taking into account any law
or the essential orientation of sexual life to its fruits of fertility, then this idea has nothing
Christian in it. It is even unworthy of man." Id.
88. See Albert Mohler, Can Christians Use Birth Control? (May 8, 2006), http://
www.albertmohler.com/commentary-read.php?cdate=2006-05-08 (criticizing the separa-
tion of sex from procreation). Albert Mohler is the president of the Southern Baptist The-
ological Seminary. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, President, http://www.sbts.
edu/President.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). Mohler argues that "[t] he effective separa-
tion of sex from procreation may be one of the most important defining marks of our age."
Mohler, supra.
89. See id.
90. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Y tY L.J. 769, 820-24 (2002) (arguing that the perva-
sive pressure to remain closeted diminished the social and political power of gays).
The multiplicity of gay closets means that gays can choose to be open to pro-gay
audiences while remaining closeted to anti-gay ones. That gays have exercised this
choice is unsurprising, as many entitlements can turn on selective closeting. Yet
while this selectivity might be empowering for individual homosexuals, it has in-
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against homosexuality and other marginalized identities creates pres-
sure to deny that identity-in essence, to become more anonymous
and diffuse. 91
The criminal prohibitions on these activities contribute to their
stigmatized nature. In Bowers, Justice White points out that
"[p] roscriptions against [homosexual sodomy] have ancient roots,"9 2
and he lists the long tradition of outlawing consensual sodomy.9 3 It
would be hard to state, in the face of what amounts to historical state
persecution, that homosexuality (and sexuality of any kind, for that
matter) is not subject to stigmatization. Thus, the activities protected
by the right to privacy-contraception, pornography, abortion, sod-
omy-are all stigmatized to some degree in our culture.
4. Privately Popular
Each of the activities that the Court outlawed in the right to pri-
vacy cases achieved a measure of privately expressed popularity at the
time of the decision, and, in most cases, the activity was becoming
more popular at the time the Court recognized the right.
Around the time the Court decided Stanley in 1969, attitudes to-
ward pornography were generally tolerant.94 A sizable proportion of
hibited the ways in which the gay rights movement has been able to resist the
passing norm. This collective action problem is what gives color to the wish ex-
pressed by gay activists that all gays would turn blue, a transformation that would
make gays, like most racial minorities, unable to pick and choose among their
audiences.
Id. at 820-21 (footnotes omitted).
91. Id. at 772 ("Thus a lesbian might be comfortable being gay and saying she is gay,
but might nonetheless modulate her identity to permit others to ignore her orientation.
She might, for example, (1) not engage in public displays of same-sex affection; (2) not
engage in gender-atypical activity that could code as gay; or (3) not engage in gay activ-
ism."). While it is true that gays and lesbians have created distinct and supportive commu-
nities in larger cities,
[i]t continues to be true that "for many gay people [the closet] is still the funda-
mental feature of social life; and there can be few gay people, however coura-
geous and forthright by habit, however fortunate in the support of their
immediate communities, in whose lives the closet is not still a shaping presence."
Id. at 824 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
92. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
93. Id. at 192-94.
94. See Nat'l Opinion Research Ctr., Univ. of Chi., General Social Surveys, 1972-2004:
Cumulative File, at question 222 (2005), available at http://sda.berkeley.edu/D3/GSS04/
Docyr/gs040021.htm#PORNLAW (feelings about pornography law). In a 1973 poll, re-
spondents favored pornography being legal to those over the age of eighteen by a margin
of about fifty-seven to forty-three. The statistics indicate that 48% of poll respondents
wanted pornography to be illegal to those under the age of eighteen, which is the same as
favoring it to be legal to those over eighteen. Id. Combined with the 9.4% in favor of it
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the American population, both male and female, had experience with
pornographic materials.9 5 Today, 61% of Americans believe pornogra-
phy should be legal for people over the age of eighteen.9 6
Similarly, birth control at the time Griswold was decided in 1965
was particularly popular. Over 80% of Gallup poll respondents were in
favor of wider availability of birth control in 1965 (an increase from
78% in 1963).9 7 In 1972, Gallup polls "recorded a generally constant
increase in the number of individuals expressing a favorable attitude
toward wider availability of birth-control services."9 8 Today 94% of
Americans find birth control morally acceptable. 99
In 1985, one year before Bowers, Americans completely disap-
proved of homosexual sex by a margin of about 75% to 14%.l ° ° In
2002, one year before Lawrence reversed Bowers, the gap narrowed by
twenty percentage points to 55% to 33%,l 1
Just prior to the re-argument of Roe in 1972, 64% of Americans
agreed with the statement that "[tihe decision to have an abortion
should be made solely by a woman and her physician" (with 31% dis-
agreeing). 102 Popular opinion tended to accept the actual procedure
of abortion at the time of Roe, as "the largest changes [with regard to
the positive view of abortion] took place in the late 1960s. ' ' 103 In 1969,
being completely legal to everyone, a total of about 57% favored pornography being legal
to those over eighteen. See id. About 43% thought it should be illegal in all circumstances.
Id.
95. See W. Cody Wilson & Herbert I. Abelson, Experience with and Attitudes Toward Ex-
plicit Sexual Materials, 29J. Soc. IssuEs 19, 27 (1973) (finding that 61% of men and 50% of
women reported having seen or read "depictions of an explicit sexual nature" in past two
years).
96. See Nat'l Opinion Research Ctr., supra note 94. In 2004, 56.7% of poll respondents
favored pornography being illegal to those under the age of eighteen, which is the same as
favoring it to be legal to those over eighteen. Id. Combined with the 4.3% in favor of it
being completely legal to everyone, a total of 61% favored pornography being legal to
those over eighteen. Id.
97. C. THOMAS DIENES, LAW, POLITICS, AND BIRTH CONTROL 151 (1972).
98. Id.
99. ABC News/Wash. Post Poll, U.S. Catholics Admire the Pope yet Differ with Many
of His Views (Oct. 15, 2003), available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/pdf/935a2Pope.
pdf.
100. Nat'l Opinion Research Ctr., supra note 94, at question 219, available at http://
sda.berkeley.edu/D3/GSS04/Docyr/gs040020.htm#HOMOSEX (homosexual sex
relations).
101. Id.
102. Gallup Poll, Abortion (Aug. 25, 1972). Five percent of poll respondents answered
"no opinion." Id. Other polls, infra notes 107-10, indicate less support for laws permitting
women to end pregnancy.
103. Judith Blake, The Supreme Court's Abortion Decisions and Public Opinzon in the United
States, 3 POPULATION & DEV. Rv. 45, 50 (1977).
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when asked: "Would you favor or oppose a law which would permit a
woman to go to a doctor to end pregnancy at any time during the first
three months?," 40% of Americans answered "favor" and 50% an-
swered "oppose.' 10 4 By December of 1972, the ratio was 46% "favor"
and 45% "oppose."'01 5 In March of 1974, one year after Roe was de-
cided, the ratio increased again to 47% in favor and 44% opposed. 10 6
Currently, 52% believe that abortion should be legal in most or all
cases, and 43% believe that abortion should be illegal in most or all
cases. 07
B. Public Choice Theory and the Distribution of Political Power
Public choice theory describes the broad field in which principles
of economics are applied to political science to explain why govern-
ments act the way they do.108 In particular, three principles of public
choice theory help explain my conclusion that the right to privacy
protects anonymous and diffuse popular practices.
First, public choice theory posits that the legislative process is
generally controlled by the laws of supply and demand-demand cre-
ated by interest groups 0 9 and supply furnished by legislators whose
primary motivation is to maximize their chances of reelection.110
104. Gallup Poll, Abortions (Nov. 30, 1969). Ten percent of poll respondents answered
.no opinion." Id.
105. Gallup Poll, Abortion (Jan. 28, 1973) (interviewing occurred in December 1972).
Nine percent of poll respondents answered "no opinion." Id.
106. Gallup Poll, Abortion (Apr. 7, 1974) (interviewing occurred in March 1974). Nine
percent of poll respondents answered "no opinion." Id.
107. Schulman et al., PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS SURVEY (Aug.
1-18, 2007), http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm. Divining the support for abor-
tion is a particularly difficult task, considering that public opinion depends almost entirely
on how the question is phrased. For example, 34% of Americans believe that abortion
should be generally available, 39% believe that there should be stricter limits than are
currently established, and 25% believe that it should not be permitted. CBS News/N.Y.
Times Poll (Sept. 4-9, 2007), http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm. Absent Roe,
the "stricter limits" group would determine the future of abortion regulation, but it is not
at all clear that even they know what "stricter limits" means in practice.
108. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRIckY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 12-13 (1991).
109. SeeJAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OP CONSENT 43-62
(1962). See generally GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE (1975) (discussing
government responses to special interests).
110. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3,
11 (1971).
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While the extent of this motivation is debatable,1 1 1 most commenta-
tors acknowledge that self-interest is a core concern for legislators.
112
Second, public choice theory recognizes the necessity of interest
groups and their impact on the inequality of political power. In order
to acquire favorable legislation, a group must have the ability to gener-
ate political pressure by providing the money and the votes necessary
to participate in the market for legislation. 113 But free riders dilute
the resources of the group, and the impact of prohibition is unequally
distributed across the group, which further depresses group participa-
tion.114 Because large, diffuse groups suffer from free rider and une-
qual impact problems, it is more difficult for them to organize into
interest groups than for easily identified smaller groups.1 15
Third, government actors have greater incentive to act to placate
deep, intensely-held interests than shallow, broadly-held interests be-
cause the political cost of a motivated opponent can be greater than
the marginal benefit to the broad interest.' 16
Practical limits on public choice theory involve issues of ideology.
When support for special interests could damage government actors,
government actors will reject those interests." 7 Thus, the perception
111. Compare DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13-15 (1974)
(arguing that legislators are interested in being reelected and "nothing else"), with RICH-
ARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITEES 1 (1973) (arguing that reelection is one of
several interests, including maximizing influence in Congress and making good public
policy).
112. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Prospects for Formal Models of Legzslatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q.
5, 12-13 (1985).
113. See FARBER & FicRKEv, supra note 108, at 12-37.
114. Free riders are created when members of the group can reap the benefits of
group action without contributing to the group. RICi-ARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE
THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 30 (1996) ("[F]ree riding...
indicates one agent's reliance on the public good provision of another." (citation omit-
ted)); see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 537-38 (1991). The problem of
unequal impact occurs when only a few members of the group are affected (and are there-
fore motivated to act), while the rest of the group remains safe (and is therefore not moti-
vated to act). See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (stating that "nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers
were affected").
115. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcrnoN: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 165-67 (1965).
116. SeeWILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICIE', CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
TION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 55-56 (2d ed. 1995). This is known as
the theory of the "ungrateful electorate." Id. at 55.
117. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legisla-
tive Process As Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 19 80s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 107 (1990)
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of the dominant cultural ideology provides a strong limit on what gov-
ernment actors do.
The tenets can be summarized as follows: "(1) that reelection is
an important motive of legislators, (2) that constituent and contribu-
tor interests thereby influence legislators, and (3) that small, easily
organized interest groups have an influence disproportionate to the
size of their membership."' 18
C. The Structural Effects on the Political Power of S-Groups
The final step of the factor analysis approach is to determine why
the four characteristics of S-groups influence the decisions of the
Court. Public choice theory illuminates why these particular charac-
teristics are important. Specifically, the first three factors-anony-
mous, diffuse, and socially stigmatized-explain why these activities
and their supporters lack political power. The final factor, popularity,
explains why this lack of political power is unfair.
1. Organizational Disadvantages of S-Groups
The structural defects surrounding S-groups are the anonymous,
diffuse, and stigmatized nature of their activities. Each of these charac-
teristics serves to reinforce the others, and together they deny effec-
tive political representation to proponents of the affected activities
and supporters of their decriminalization. 19
The anonymity of S-group members works against their ability to
effectively organize.1 20 Because the members can successfully remain
anonymous (so long as they are not caught by the haphazardly en-
forced criminal prohibitions 2 1 ), the burdens of criminalization are
("Reelection depends... on accumulating goodwill and avoiding illwill. To many in Con-
gress, this fact suggested paying close attention to how the media portrayed tax reform,
notwithstanding the lack of strong public support for any actual reform proposal. Given
the public's relative inattention, a member could be harmed by a story portraying her as a
venal hack even if the public agreed with her position.").
118. FARBER & FRicKEY, supra note 108, at 33.
119. Id. at 146 (stating that "beyond the normal disadvantages of organizing large, dif-
fuse groups, opponents of 'morals' legislation have a special disadvantage"). The authors
go on to suggest that Griswold might be read to support a majority interest that has been
suppressed and cannot compete fairly in the political market. Id. at 146-49.
120. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 726.
121. Consider the absurd chain of events that occurred for the participants in Bowers to
be apprehended: the police had to have valid permission to search the plaintiff's home
and, at the same time, observe him and another man engaged in sodomy. See PETER IRONS,
THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 381 (1988). Similarly, the plaintiffs in Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557, 558 (1969) (involving a plaintiff who was arrested when police were
searching for "bookmaking" activity and found pornography instead) and Lawrence v.
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not forced equally upon the group in a way that would generate the
pressure to organize to change the system.1 22 By limiting an act to the
privacy of one's home, one also limits the ability of supporters to polit-
ically organize.
S-group members are also hurt by their diffuseness. The consum-
ers of pornography, for example, exist (anonymously) across socioeco-
nomic and racial classes, and therefore, there is no easily identified
group that can band together to advance their agenda. While there
may be some variance between the groups,1 23 pornography use is not
overwhelmingly concentrated among one identifiable demographic
cohort.1 24 Because pornography users are widely dispersed, there are
significant organizational costs in creating a political lobby: the cost of
communication between members; 125 the free rider problem that ex-
ists when the community is connected only loosely;1 26 and geographic
diversity, which serves to dilute any political representation that could
arise from concentrating in a specific location. 127
Finally, stigmatization is perhaps the strongest factor suppressing
the organization necessary to achieve political power. Americans rec-
ognize the need for anonymity in electing representatives. We use a
secret ballot in elections because it allows us to vote for our preferred
candidate without suffering any unwanted attention based on our
choice.128 But it is clear that the process that influences representa-
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (involving a plaintiff who was arrested when police re-
sponded to a deliberately false weapons disturbance report called in by an irate neighbor),
were ensnared largely by chance.
122. As a contrasting example, one's wealth is a matter of public record. Because the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") can easily identify the rich, our tax laws are enforced
equally, and thus they affect every member of that group. Thus, each member of the group
has equal incentive to change the laws that affect them, and they can more successfully
organize and exert pressure.
123. Pornography is consumed far more frequently by men than women, see Wilson &
Abelson, supra note 95, but even that does not cure the diffuse aspect, as men are distrib-
uted fairly evenly throughout the country.
124. Frank Rich, Naked Capitalists, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2001, (Magazine), at 50 (quoting
the founder of Adult Video News as saying, "Porn doesn't have a demographic-it goes
across all demographics").
125. See FARBER & FRicFv,, supra note 108, at 146. In part because communication costs
are lower, "relatively compact groups are likely to exercise undue influence." Id.
126. See OLsoN, supra note 115.
127. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 722-32.
128. As such, a secret ballot is universally recognized as a hallmark of fair elections. See
Christopher Hewitt, The Effect of Political Democracy and Social Democracy on Equality in Indus-
trial Societies: A Cross-National Comparison, 42 Am. Soc. Rv. 450, 457 (1977).
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tives is not at all anonymous;1 29 the organizations that affect legislative
decisions through lobbying and vote-delivery (such as unions, reli-
gious organizations, and topical interest organizations like the Na-
tional Rifle Association ("NRA")) essentially require open
membership.1 30 Being a member in an S-group lobbying organization
would admit, however, to participation in a stigmatized activity, which
is undesirable where there are specific social penalties associated with
it, so the development of a political lobby is permanently stunted.
Ultimately, the combination of these factors intensifies the im-
pact of each individually. The anonymity of S-groups is heightened by
their stigmatization; members are that much more reluctant to ex-
press their opinions openly. The diffusion of members is exacerbated
by their anonymity-the lack of concentration prevents them from
openly affiliating with one another. The stigmatization of S-group ac-
tivity is aggravated by the anonymous nature of its members. If more
people were aware of just how many of their friends and colleagues
were members of an S-group, they might be more reluctant to vilify
and marginalize the group. Finally, the criminalization of the S-group
activities further escalates both the anonymity of S-group members
and the stigmatization of the activity. All of these factors combine to
severely handicap the ability of S-group members to form an effective
political lobby, to organize a voting bloc, and to openly campaign for
their position. Because these are the only ways to influence power in
our democracy, S-group members are denied proportionate political
power. 3 1
129. Indeed, "fear that political involvement will indirectly reveal [group members']
private conduct" works to suppress the ability of groups to organize. FA", BER & FRicKaY,
supra note 108, at 146. "It is hard enough to organize car buyers into an effective political
force, but it would be much harder if most people were embarrassed to admit in public to
owning a car." Id.
130. An organization that cannot accurately identify and contact their members is
hampered in its ability to effectively pledge votes. While there are legal protections
grounded in the freedom of association, they are not absolute. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 463-64 (1958). In addition, campaign finance laws could force disclosure of indi-
vidual donor identities. David D. Storey, Note, The Amendment of Section 527: Eliminating
Stealth PACs and Providing a Model for Future Campaign Finance Reform, 77 IND. L.J. 167, 180
(2002) (finding that "[t]he new § 527 disclosure rules require organizations that were for-
merly allowed to conduct extensive issue advocacy and keep their donors' identities-and
thus their true agendas-a secret to now reveal who in fact contributed the large sums of
cash to pay for the advertisements" (footnote omitted)).
131. There are, of course, many lobbying organizations for S-groups (e.g., Emily's List
for abortion, Human Rights Campaign for homosexuality, etc.), and this Article should not
be taken to deny their existence or to disparage the work they do.
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2. Inability of S-Groups to Compete in the Political Marketplace
One thread throughout the right to privacy cases is that the activi-
ties involved are particularly popular and yet, with the possible excep-
tion of abortion,13 2 are underrepresented in the political marketplace.
As an example, in November 2005, Kansas Senator Sam Brown-
back held a series of hearings about the allegedly devastating effect of
pornography on America.133 Despite pornography's status as a multi-
billion dollar business134 and the widespread popularity of pornogra-
phy consumption among American men (and, perhaps surprisingly,
women),t35 not a single senator articulated the pro-pornography posi-
tion. 3 6 Of course, this cannot be considered a surprise-there are no
advantages to courting the diffuse and anonymous constituency that
would oppose a ban on pornography, and there are clear disadvan-
tages in alienating a responsive and motivated constituency that would
likely support it.
Only Senator Russ Feingold offered a response, and, rather than
speaking out on behalf of pornography consumers, he advised that
any anti-pornography legislation would likely be unconstitutional.
13 7
The right to privacy, in essence, speaks for these functionally disen-
franchised groups138 and protects their interests when our political
132. At least on a federal level, the representation for abortion rights seems to gener-
ally mirror the level of public approval for the procedure. The public seems to want strict
restrictions on abortion, yet keep the procedure legal, and that is by and large what has
been expressed in state legislatures. See CBS News/N.Y. Times Poll, supra note 107. But see
Monica Davey, Ripples from Law Banning Abortion Spread Through South Dakota, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2006, at Al.
133. Scherer, supra note 81.
134. Porn in the U.S.A., CBS NEWS.COM, Sept. 5, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/sto-
ries/2003/11/21/60minutes/main585049.shtml.
135. Scherer, supra note 81 ("Women ... make up about 30 percent of the audience
for online pornography.").
136. See id. (indicating, however, that the panelists did not reflect a full range of views
about porn).
137. Id. Senator Feingold's objection, that "[t]he subject of this hearing suggests that
we may be faced with proposals that go well beyond what Congress can constitutionally
undertake," id., was in all likelihood a reference to the right to privacy, which protects the
possession of pornography.
138. A not entirely dissimilar phenomenon occurs with regards to the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants-those accused of crimes will have almost no ability to fight
back against persecution by a majority, so the Constitution establishes rights that protect
their interest in a fair trial. See U.S. CoNsT. amends. IV, V, VI. Because it is prohibitively
difficult to organize on behalf of accused criminals (a cohort that is not immediately iden-
tifiable), the Constitution removes these considerations from the normal democratic
arena.
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system makes it impossible for them to influence their elected
representatives.
The right to privacy functions as a rule that prevents the govern-
ment from prohibiting popular yet socially taboo behavior unless it is
clear that the activity simply could not win in the political market-
place, even absent the cultural stigma. This becomes particularly ap-
parent when we examine areas where the court has not found a right
to privacy. Activities which are universally unpopular have not been
recognized as implicating any kind of privacy interest. For example,
the private consumption of child pornography in New York v. Ferber,13 9
unlike the private possession of pornography in Stanley, would never,
under any conditions, be able to garner support in the democratic
process, and it is therefore legitimately prohibited. 140
The lack of political power is not problematic just for those S-
groups that compose a majority-sufficiently popular minorities suf-
fer as well. Even construing the data liberally, heterosexuals greatly
outnumber homosexuals in this country, and from that we can expect
that recognizing gay rights is a minority position.14 Merely being a
numerical minority, however, does not immediately remove a group
from the political process. It is possible that, absent inherent disadvan-
tages and cultural pressure preventing political mobilization, minority
groups could realistically create cohesive voting blocs 142 and thus par-
ticipate effectively within the system. 143 Because logrolling144 is a fun-
damental part of a democratic system, the level of popularity does not
139. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
140. See id. at 762-63 (analyzing "value" as one of the factors in determining whether
the material was obscene and could be banned). Value necessarily involves a weighing of
public interest and support, which was found to be entirely lacking in this case. See id.
141. "Studies on the total number of gay and lesbian people in the United States show
a range from 2 percent to 10 percent of the total population," but the percentage is esti-
mated to be 5% of the total population. DAVID M. SMITH & GARYJ. GATES, GAY AND LESBIAN
FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES: SXME-SEx UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS (2001), availa-
le at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000491_gl-partner-households.pdf.
142. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 728.
143. This is at the core of the dilemma faced by the gay rights movement. Not only are
homosexuals in America anonymous and diffuse (gay neighborhoods in major metropoli-
tan areas notwithstanding), they are stigmatized to the point that membership in a pro-gay
rights organization offers significant disadvantages to individual gays. If being an open
member of a gay rights group, however, lacked the particularly harmful stigma that it pos-
sesses today-if belonging to such a group were as culturally innocuous as belonging to a
union or being an NRA member-it might have greater organizational power and there-
fore greater political influence.
144. Logrolling and interest-sharing refer to the processes whereby smaller political
interests band together with other interests to form a majority and pass favorable legisla-
tion. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 37 (1994).
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necessarily need to rise to the level of a majority to be politically pow-
erful. Because of the aforementioned structural defects in their con-
stituency, however, homosexuals lack both direct representation (only
one openly gay member of Congress, Barney Frank of Massachusetts)
and functional representation (the issues considered most important
to the gay community are not a part of any major party platform).
Finally, contraception, despite its massive popularity, provides an-
other example of this political disadvantage. The structural disadvan-
tages of S-groups also explain how the pro-life movement, which has
"[i] ncreasingly ... moved to attack and denigrate contraception," has
succeeded in achieving recent anti-birth control policy victories, such
as the stifling of over-the-counter sales of the Plan B contraceptive,
despite the fact that birth control has a 93% approval rating. 145 Simi-
larly, Americans come out 78% to 16% in opposition to "right of re-
fusal" laws, 146 yet "[m]ore than a dozen states are considering new
laws to protect health workers who do not want to provide care that
conflicts with their personal beliefs," including a half-dozen that
"would shield pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions for birth
control and 'morning-after' pills." 147 A possible reason for this state
and federal legislative impotence is that, aside from pharmaceutical
companies whose interest in the area is substantial, any lobbying cam-
paign on behalf of women who use contraceptives would likely be
weakened by anonymity, diffuseness, and stigmatization.
3. The Problem with a Counter-Majoritarian Democracy
The Court in Carolene Products implicitly assumed that democra-
cies should reflect the influences of their constituents on a propor-
tional basis-that a group should not have significantly less power
than its numbers warrant.' 48 Applying this theory, the Court identified
the process theory goal of representation reinforcement as an appro-
priate goal ofjudicial review.1 49 In the view of the Court, the "discrete
145. Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2006, (Magazine), at 48.
146. N.Y. Times/CBS News Poll (Nov. 18-21, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/packages/html/politics/200411 23_poll/200411 23_poll-results.pdf. The remaining
6% of Americans either did not know or did not answer. Id.
147. Rob Stein, Health Workers' Choice Debated, WAsH. POST, Jan. 30, 2006, at Al.
148. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 720 (stating that "[bly intervening on behalf of G
groups, a Carolene court merely produces the substantive outcomes that the Ggroup would
have obtained through politics if it had not been so systematically disadvantaged in the
ongoing process of pluralist bargaining").
149. Id. at 715 ("Carolene proposed to make the ideals of the victorious activist Democ-
racy serve as a primary foundation for constitutional rights in the United States.").
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and insular minorities" would lose more often than they deserved to,
and therefore any regulation directed at them should be subject to
stricter review. 150 The Court explicitly recognized the deficiency in-
herent in a majority-rule democratic process and resolved to correct
it-to "seize the high ground of democratic theory" and overrule laws
when the "challenged legislation was produced by a profoundly defec-
tive process."151
Similarly, the right to privacy can be understood as a correction
in the profoundly defective democratic marketplace-a natural exten-
sion of Carolene Products and its concern for the unfairly unrepre-
sented. This kind of intervention to negate the disproportionate
influence of specific interest groups and promote diffuse popular in-
terests' 52 works to preserve the basic utilitarian nature of democracy
and avoids the judicial counter-majoritarian problem of unelected
judges thwarting the majority will. t 53 It is therefore entirely consistent
with the tenets of process theory. 15 4
Bruce Ackerman came to a similar conclusion in Beyond Carolene
Products, finding that a representation reinforcement approach would
justify protection for groups that are neither discrete nor insular and
are thus disadvantaged in the political process.' 55 However, another
variable-stigmatization-plays just as important a role in suppressing
the expression of political interests and therefore belongs in the anal-
ysis. 1 56 It is at this intersection of Ackerman's anonymous and diffuse
groups with the socially stigmatized where protection of political mi-
150. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (demanding a
"more searching judicial inquiry").
151. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 715.
152. Farber and Frickey, from the perspective of advocates for republicanism and the
"public good," also argue for the reduction of the power of special interests. See FARBER &
FmcKEY, supra note 108, at 132-43. Their methods include limiting the power of Political
Action Committees ("PACs") through campaign finance reform, reinforcing the Court's
anti-delegation doctrine, and limiting legislative deference in the face of legislative obsoles-
cence. Id.
153. See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 48.
154. The Court's job in such cases is to look at the world as it exists and ask
whether such a right [such as the right to vote] is in fact being abridged, and if it
is, to consider what reasons might be adduced in support of the deprivation, with-
out regard to what actually occasioned it. To the extent that there is a stoppage,
the system is malfunctioning, and the Court should unblock it without caring how it got
that way.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 52, at 136 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
155. Ackerman, supra note 3.
156. An alternate title for this Article is Beyond Beyond Carolene Products.
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norities is most needed. Tellingly, it is at this point where the right to
privacy has been recognized.
When the right to privacy is applied in a manner consistent with
process theory and Carolene Products's goal of representation reinforce-
ment, it ultimately benefits democratic self-governance by curbing the
power of counter-majoritarian interests. What is troubling about our
system, and should be troubling to anyone invested in a democratic
system of government, is that S-groups are denied effective political
representation because of their secondary characteristics (anonymity,
diffusion, and stigmatization) and despite their popularity. Shouldn't
popularity be the criterion that really matters in a democracy?
IV. Conclusion
A. The Court and the Political Process Rationale for the Right to
Privacy
The Court has never articulated protecting popular practices
from democratic failure as ajustification for the right to privacy. But
there are three reasons why the Court might feel its pull.
The first is historical-the framers of the Constitution deliber-
ately structured the government to be multi-headed with the intention
of making change difficult. 157 They were worried about "factions" seiz-
ing control of the government based on temporary hysteria and using
the government for self-interested means. 158 The right to privacy re-
flects the framers' concerns, as it prevents parties whose strength is
disproportionate to their numbers from gaming the system and using
the democratic branches to advance their agendas.
The second reason is doctrinal-the Court, in several of its deci-
sions, specifically identified a nexus between utilitarian results and
democratic processes.1 59 The "one person, one vote" principle in the
right to vote cases, for example, is evidence that the Court considers
the structure that best represents the interests of the electorate when
determining what the appropriate political process should be. 160 Simi-
157. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (indicating Madison's concern
with majority interests abusing minority rights and his advocacy for the separation of pow-
ers as well as the bicameral legislature as checks against sweeping changes by powerful
interests).
158. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
159. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
160. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562, 579-80 (holding that one person, one vote was constitu-
tionally mandated because "[1] egislators represent people, not trees or acres" and "neither
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larly, the endorsement of representation reinforcement 6 is an im-
plicit acknowledgment of this nexus.1 6 2 It is not only that democracy is
the only form of government the Constitution recognizes as legiti-
mate, but also that the unique structure of democratic processes
brings us closer to a utilitarian ideal. Thus, results that do not reflect a
true utilitarian process where everyone's interests are weighed equally
might be suspect in the eyes of the Court. The right to privacy, as a
way of striking down the results of an anti-utilitarian process, rein-
forces the connection between democracy and utility.
The final reason is experiential-protecting popular yet stigma-
tized positions historically fared better than allowing the opposition to
prohibit the practices. Commentators have long encouraged the
Court to craft decisions and legal rulings that will be "durable,"' 6 3 and
the right to privacy has proven surprisingly enduring. Supreme Court
nominees are essentially forced to pledge that they will uphold
Griswold.16 4
The country's experience with the Eighteenth Amendment
prohibiting alcohol, on the other hand, provides an illuminative
counterexample: the attempt to outlaw a popular yet demonized prac-
tice did not endure. 165 Prohibition, enacted as a result of a well-organ-
ized temperance movement relying on religious morality and bad
science,' 66 serves as a particularly effective cautionary tale. It demon-
strated the powerlessness of a stigmatized, diffuse interest base (no
interest groups effectively organized against the movement), the inevi-
table failure that any such prohibition will engender (rampant boot-
legging, flagrant lawbreaking, misery, etc.), and the ultimate backlash
it will generate (the Twenty-First Amendment1 67 ).
history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in
attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation").
161. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
162. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 716 n.4 ("Like Carolene, the reapportionment cases
try to identify situations of disproportionate influence without making substantive judg-
ments about the political interests that the judges think the legislature ought to favor.
Instead, the concept of illegitimate influence is elucidated through a formula-'one per-
son, one vote'-grounded on the theory of democratic process.").
163. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 99
(1969) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT].
164. See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 9, at 318 (statements of Arlen Specter, Mem-
ber, S. Judiciary Comm., and Samuel Alito, Judge).
165. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
166. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 589-93 (1926) (deferring to Congress's find-
ings regarding the value of alcohol).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
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In the end, the Court's position is some combination of these
three reasons. Ten years after Roe, Professor Ely, echoing the feeling
of many scholars, has admitted that even if there is no legitimate basis
for the right to privacy, "[i] n many ways the country is better off' for
having the right.168 The fact that we are better off with the right to
privacy confirms that the right serves a utilitarian function. As both
the founders and the Court acknowledge, democracy must be tailored
to produce true democratic (utilitarian) results.1 69 The right to pri-
vacy therefore fits squarely within a political process theory of consti-
tutional jurisprudence and is a legitimate right.
B. Protecting Popular Practices from Democratic Failure
The purpose of the right to privacy is to provide protection to
easily stigmatized yet popular practices that, for systemic reasons, can-
not compete in the political marketplace. This form of representation
reinforcement recognizes the distinct problem of a "moral minority"
taking advantage of a group (often a majority) that is unable to de-
fend itself.170 The right to privacy counteracts this problem by shifting
the burden to the state to prove that absent structural defects-the
combination of anonymity, diffusion, and stigmatization that sup-
presses opposing views-the opponents of the prohibition would still
fail.
There are other areas in addition to the established privacy cases
where this right could apply. For example, 90% of Americans in their
twenties have engaged in pre-marital sex, 171 and only 36% of all Amer-
icans believe it to be morally wrong.172 Yet pre-marital sex (fornica-
tion) is still criminal conduct in some states. 173 Similarly, private
168. Steven Pressman, Ten Years Later, Abortion Ruling Still Stirs Turmoil, L.A. DAILYJ.,
Jan. 21, 1983, at 1.
169. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964) (finding that because "legisla-
tures are responsible for enacting laws by which all citizens are to be governed, they should
be bodies which are collectively responsive to the popular will," and "the achieving of fair
and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative
apportionment").
170. Jonathan Cohn, Moral Minority, NEW REPUBLIC ONUNE, Nov. 3, 2006, http://
www.demos.org/pubs/Moral%20Minority%20TNR%2011.3.06.pdf.
171. Id.
172. Gallup Poll, The Cultural Landscape: What's Morally Acceptable? (June 22, 2004).
173. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6603 (2004) (indicating that fornication is punishable by
fine, imprisonment, or both); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (West 2003) (indicating that for-
nication is a misdemeanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (2003) (indicating that fornica-
tion is a misdemeanor); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977); State v. Frankum, 425
S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. 1968) (indicating that fornication is the "illicit sexual intercourse
between a man, whether married or single, and an unmarried woman" (citation omitted)).
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marijuana use is both popular and tolerated: 47% of Americans report
using marijuana at some point in their lives174 -a number that will
only increase as the population ages and the baby boom generation
replaces the Depression-era generation-and 76% of Americans want
to see it decriminalized. 175 Yet, Alaska remains the only state in the
union that has decriminalized the private possession of marijuana.1 76
Tellingly, Alaska did not decriminalize possession of marijuana via the
state legislature but through the state constitution's right to privacy. 177
This theory of the right to privacy is distinct from the views of
those who believe that the Supreme Court uses substantive due pro-
cess to predict the values of future generations.' 78 Professor Ely was
correct in casting this approach as fundamentally anti-democratic:
"Controlling today's generation by the values of its grandchildren is
no more acceptable than controlling it by the values of its grandpar-
ents .... ,11 79 The Court is instead attempting to determine the relative
strength of society's attitudes in the present and whether such atti-
tudes are prevented from being adequately expressed. Of course, this
still exposes the Court's decision-making to charges of self-fulfilling
prophesies, 80 but at least it is a slightly more value-neutral endeavor
than attempting to predict future public sentiment.
Of course, there are those who believe the Court should not be in
the business of gauging public opinion at all. For these theorists, the
task of measuring public preferences necessarily belongs exclusively to
the political branches. 18' It is clear that the Court already crossed this
Rubicon, however, for several established constitutional doctrines and
a handful of explicit constitutional provisions require the Court to an-
swer constitutional questions by examining the values and the beliefs
of the society at large.' 8 2 While the task of gauging public opinion is
174. CNN/Time Magazine Poll (Oct. 23-24, 2002), http://norml.org/index.cfm?
GroupID=5550.
175. Id. Seventy-two percent would favor the penalty being reduced to a fine and 4%
would favor no penalty whatsoever. Id.
176. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
177. Id.; seeALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
178. See, e.g., BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 163.
179. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 52, at 70.
180. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 385 (1973) ("The judge
cannot claim that legislative acquiescence legitimizes his action because he himself creates, through his
decision of particular cases, the situation from which will emerge an as yet indeterminate constellation
of legislative power.").
181. See Wechsler, supra note 59, at 9-10.
182. For First Amendment challenges, the Court uses "community standards" as the
baseline for determining protected speech. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
(citation omitted). For Eighth Amendment challenges, the Court surveys the "evolving
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difficult, and the task of determining when there has been a failure in
the political marketplace even more so, the Court must police the leg-
islature to align it with the Constitution and the utilitarian ideal that
informs our system of democratic self-governance. After all, if the
Court does not, who else will?
Ultimately, the right to representative democracy and the invali-
dation of prohibitions against stigmatized-yet-popular practices raises
a unique dilemma. The problem with these prohibitions is that they
are clearly counter-majoritarian, but the virtue of these prohibitions is
that they are enacted by a democratically elected legislature. Solving
this dilemma requires us to answer the question of what is more im-
portant in our system of government: the people or the process? By
using the right to privacy to strike down unpopular yet democratic
prohibitions, the Supreme Court has apparently made its choice, and
for that it should be applauded.
standards of decency." See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (citations omit-
ted). Even under a textualist approach, the Court would still have to determine what quali-
fies as "unusual" punishment. See id. at 312. For common law actions, courts all over the
country must determine what-or who-is the "reasonable man" in any given locality. See
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 93 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap Press
1963) (1881). Other difficult and value-laden determinations include the determination of
fair market value for property in takings cases and the determination of what counts as
partiality in Sixth Amendment jury composition cases. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725
(1961) (examining the "current community pattern of thought"); United States v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (instructing courts to determine "market value" for property in
takings cases).
[Vol. 42
